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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. Case No. 20020939-CA 
TRENT TUCKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2000), in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over cases 
transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 
2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or violate defendant's confrontation 
rights in its rulings on the admissibility of the medical examiner's testimony during direct 
and cross-examination? 
"The trial court has wide discretion" in its rulings on the admissibility of expert 
testimony, "and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." 
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). The reviewing 
court will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony unless the trial 
court's decision "exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^  66, 
44 P.3d 794 (citation omitted). 
2. Did defendant adequately brief his claim that the court answered a question by 
the jury outside defendant's presence, and does the record support defendant's claim? 
No standard of review applies. 
3. Did the trial court plainly err in suggesting an order of deliberation? 
To demonstrate plain error a defendant must show that error occurred, that it was 
obvious, and that it was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). This 
Court reviews "jury instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions as 
a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case." State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2dl219, 1231 (Utah 1997). 
4. Did the prosecutor improperly question a gun expert about the gun's flash or 
the propensity of the gun to fire without a trigger pull, where the parties had stipulated 
that the expert could testify to how the gun operated? If the gun expert "volunteered" 
improper testimony, did the court's curative instruction render that testimony harmless? 
In any event., where the evidence was otherwise admissible and where defendant did not 
move for a continuance, can defendant claim error on appeal for lack of notice? 
This Court "will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion based on 
prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion. This standard is met only if the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. 
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Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, \ 10, 69 P.3d 1278. An instruction to the jury to disregard an 
improper answer is sufficient if it dispels any prejudice. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 
272-73 (Utah 1998). Further, failure to seek a continuance waives a claim of error based 
on lack of notice. See State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, U 13, 56 P.3d 969. 
5. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a new trial where 
defendant's proffered testimony was neither "newly discovered" nor admissible? 
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). 
6. Did the evidence suffice to sustain the verdict? 
A court will find the evidence insufficient only when, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the verdict, the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he [or she] was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 
1997) (alteration in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1999) 
Utah R. Evid. 606 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
Utah R. Evid. 703 
Utah R. Evid. 704. 
Utah R. Evid. 804; and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2000). R. 41-42. The trial court asked the jury to determine 
whether defendant was guilty of murder, guilty of a lesser included offense of 
manslaughter or negligent homicide, or not guilty . R. 246-290, 338-343. The jury found 
defendant guilty of murder. R. 338. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison 
term of five years to life. R. 408-409. He timely appealed. R. 469-70. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime. Defendant shared a home with his father, Tommy Tucker; Tommy's 
girlfriend, Phyllis Coreen Lenear Agar (Coreen); defendant's younger half- or step-
brother, Jeremy Kettler; and Ronald Smith (Ron). R. 489:27-28, ?6-37; 490:230-231. 
On the morning of February 9, 2001, defendant and Coreen argued loudly enough to 
awaken Jeremy. R. 489:81; 490:237. Jeremy looked down over the stairs and saw 
defendant with his hands around Coreen's neck. Id. 
Defendant went to work, but returned later in the day. R. 490:231. Coreen, 
Jeremy, Ron., and a group of Coreen's friends were gathered at the home. Id. at 231-32. 
The friends included Tina, Barbie, and at least three males, including one named 
"Magic." R. 489:48, 490:231-32. Defendant joined them in "a lot of drinking." 
R. 490:231. Later, one of the male friends began a fight with Ron, and defendant and 
Jeremy jumped in. R. 490:232. While Ron and Jeremy were fighting with the friend, 
defendant ran downstairs and got a gun. Id. When he came back upstairs, two of the 
male friends were leaving. Id. 
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Defendant placed the gun in his pants and went to the kitchen. Id. at 232-33. He 
found Magic in the kitchen and asked Magic "what the heck he was still doing there." Id. 
at 233. Defendant and Magic began to fight, defendant's gun fell to the floor, and Magic 
grabbed it and began pistol-whipping defendant. Id. Jeremy jumped in and wrested the 
gun from Magic. Id. at 234. Jeremy escorted Magic out. R. 489:54. 
Defendant, who had exited the room, reentered and asked for the gun. Id. at 55. 
Jeremy gave it to him. Id. Defendant then took Coreen and the gun into the bedroom and 
closed the door. R. 490:235, 246. A few minutes later, Jeremy heard a gunshot. 
R. 489:55-56. Jeremy went to the bedroom and tried to open the door, but he had 
difficulty getting in. Id. at 56. He felt resistance as he tried to turn the doorknob. Id. 
When he opened the door, he found defendant in the room and Coreen lying on the floor. 
Id. Jeremy asked defendant, "What [did] you do?" Id. at 60. Defendant responded, "I 
didn't mean to. She made me do it; I didn't mean to." Id. Jeremy then punched two 
holes in the wall and punched defendant, knocking him out. Id. at 60-62. Jeremy 
testified that he had never before knocked anyone unconscious. Id. at 62. Jeremy 
testified that the gun was not cocked when he gave it to defendant. Id. at 52. 
Defendant, who disappeared, apparently did not assist in efforts to get emergency 
care for Coreen. R. 490:239-40. When police officers arrived, they found Coreen lying 
in the bedroom with Tommy Tucker, defendant's father, on one side of her body and 
Barbara Penman on the other side. R. 487:11. Coreen had suffered a fatal shot that 
entered her body on the inner side of the left eye. R. 490:184. 
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Defendant's version. Defendant testified that he wanted to talk to Coreen when 
he took her into the bedroom and closed the door. R. 490:235, 246. He stated that he 
asked her what "the heck the deal was with her friends" and threatened to "take care of 
[Magic's problem]" if Magic was still there. R. 490:235. Defendant said that when he 
started for the door, Coreen said, "No," grabbed the gun with both of her hands, and 
pulled it toward herself. Id. at 236. He testified that the gun went off accidentally during 
the struggle. Id. 
Reminded that the gun was a single-action revolver that would fire only if cocked, 
defendant testified, "I'm not for sure if I cocked it right then [at the time Jeremy returned 
it to him] or if I cocked it after I went into the bedroom." Id. at 235; see also 
R. 490:148-49. 
Medical examiner's testimony. The State called Dr. Edward A. Leis, Utah's 
deputy chief medical examiner, to testify to the cause and manner of Coreen's death. 
R. 490:173. He testified that he had examined her body and certified that the cause of 
death was a gunshot wound to the head. Id. at 184. He also testified to a "strangulation 
type" injury to the neck—two parallel red lines caused by pressure to the neck within 
twenty-four hours of death. Id. at 180-81. He further stated that he found small pinpoint 
hemorrhages in the eyes and inside the mouth, other injuries consistent with attempted 
strangulation. Id. 
Dr. Leis further stated that one of his duties as a medical examiner, when 
conducting an autopsy, was to certify a manner of death, that is, to assign the death to a 
statistical classification as (i) a natural death, (ii) a suicide, (iii) an accident, (iv) a 
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homicide, or (v) a death that occurred in an undetermined manner. Id. at 184. He 
testified that he had certified the manner of Coreen's death as a homicide. Id. He 
explained that, for statistical purposes, a homicide is defined as "a deliberate act of one 
individual leading to the death of another individual." Id. 
Dr. Leis clarified, however, that in classifying a gunshot death as a homicide, he 
does not make a judgment about the shooter's intent. Id. at 190. He explained that while, 
for purposes of his classification scheme, Coreen's death was a homicide, that did not 
mean that he had determined that the person who inflicted the wound was not "acting 
under extreme emotional distress." Id. at 191. 
He further clarified that, under the classification scheme, a gunshot death will only 
be accidental if the gun is faulty in some respect. Id. at 189. In classifying a death as a 
homicide or as an accident, he therefore does not make a determination of intent, which is 
a question for a jury to decide. Id. at 190, 193. In other words, if "somebody was 
unaware of a gun being loaded and it was loaded and they pulled the trigger and it fired," 
killing someone, he would classify the death as a homicide and not as an accident. Id. at 
189. 
The trial judge sustained objections to cross-examination questions about the 
medical examiner's understanding of the intent of a person who fired a gun, not knowing 
it was loaded. Id. at 189. She also sustained an objection to a question about whether a 
gunshot wound that the medical examiner classified as a homicide "could be fired under 
extreme emotional distress" or could be fired by "somebody acting with criminal 
negligence." Id. at 190-91. She did, however, permit the medical examiner to testify that 
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his definition of homicide "would not exclude someone acting under extreme emotional 
stress." Id. at 191. After the jury was excused, the judge explained that she had 
permitted defense counsel to cross-examine the medical examiner a couple of times with 
respect to intent, but that she had disallowed "any kind of speculation or conclusion that 
was a legal one." Id. at 198-99. 
Gun expert's testimony. A few days before trial, the State indicated that it 
planned to call Nicholas J. Roberts, Salt Lake County firearms director and range master, 
as a gun expert, apparently substituting him for David Wakefield, who was not available 
to testify. R. 216; 489:24-25; 490:193. Observing that Roberts was a last minute expert, 
defense counsel stated that he had agreed in advance not to object based on notice, so 
long as the Roberts' testimony was limited to the description of the physical operation of 
the gun. R. 489:25. The prosecutor concurred in defense counsel's characterization of 
the agreement. Id. 
Roberts testified that the bullet recovered from the victim's head was fired from 
the revolver identified as State's exhibit 13. R. 490:147. He also testified that in order to 
fire the gun, the safety had to be removed, the weapon cocked, and the trigger pulled Id. 
at 149. 
Roberts also testified that operation of the gun creates a "flash that comes out the 
front and both sides." Id. at 158. When the primer ignites, it passes through a flash hole 
and lights the gunpowder, building up pressure and popping the bullet from the cylinder 
through the barrel. Id. The flash consists of heated gases and unburned powder. Id. 
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Some of the gases and powder follow the bullet out of the cylinder, and some of them 
come out the sides. Id. at 150-57. 
The prosecutor then asked Roberts whether dropping the loaded and cocked gun 
would cause it to fire. Id. at 157. Roberts said that it would not. Id. The prosecutor then 
asked whether throwing the gun would cause it to fire. Id. at 159. Roberts again 
responded that it would not. The prosecutor then asked "what [would] happen[] if there 
was a struggle over the gun." Id. Roberts answered again that the gun would not fire. At 
this point, defense counsel objected, arguing lack of "foundation for what a 'struggle' 
means." Id. The prosecutor then clarified, "If there were two people playing tug-of-war 
with the gun." Id. Roberts responded, "If two people were playing tug-of-war with this 
gun that I checked, this gun would still have to have its trigger pulled to have been fired. 
And there would be burning of somebody. Somebody would be burned." Id. 
Defendant objected, arguing that this testimony was beyond the scope of the 
agreement between the prosecution and the defense. Id. at 150, 159. The judge took the 
objection under advisement. Id. at 159. The judge later took argument on the objection. 
Id. at 168. The prosecutor argued that the physics of how a gun works, including the fact 
that a revolver expels gases, was within the agreement. Id. at 168-69. The judge 
concluded that the testimony was generally within the scope of the agreement, but struck 
the "volunteered" response that "somebody would have been burned." Id. at 169. 
The judge asked defense counsel whether he would like her to tell the jury that the 
statement had been stricken. Id. At defense counsel's request, the judge told the jury that 
9 
they should disregard the testimony about someone's being burned. Id. at 170. 
Defendant did not ask for a continuance. 
Motion for new trial While examining Jeremy, the prosecutor asked how Jeremy 
had been awakened on the day of the shooting. R. 489:68. Jeremy answered that he had 
been awakened by his employer. Id. at 69. The prosecutor then asked Jeremy whether he 
remembered having made any statements to a police detective, Kelly Kent, about an 
argument that took place that morning. Id. Jeremy said that he did not. Id. The 
prosecutor then showed Jeremy a copy of his recorded interview with Kent. Id. at 69-70. 
Asked again whether he remembered making those statements, he again said that he did 
not. Id. 
Kent later testified that Jeremy told her that he was awakened that morning when 
he heard defendant and Coreen arguing on the stairs. Id. at 81. Jeremy told her that "he 
saw Trent with his hands around Coreen's neck." Id. 
Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial. R. 411-413. 
Defendant claimed, among other things, that he had newly discovered evidence that he 
had not choked Coreen. R. 427-428. Attached to the memorandum was the affidavit of 
Barbara Penman, who stated that she had seen defendant and Coreen together earlier on 
the day of Coreen's death, that they appeared to be interacting happily, and that Coreen 
had told her that defendant had not choked her. R. 436. The State responded, arguing 
that defendant knew that Penman was present on the day of the death and that the 
evidence she might have presented was available before trial. R. 462. Further, Penman's 
testimony would be hearsay. R. 464. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, 
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holding that "[defendant's proffered evidence to assert grounds for a new trial is neither 
newly discovered nor now admissible." R. 467. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not err in its rulings on the admissibility of the medical 
expert's testimony. The medical expert's testimony that he had classified the manner of 
death as homicide was not testimony regarding the shooter's intent. This testimony was 
admissible even though the medical examiner relied, to some extent, on information from 
investigative sources because experts in his field reasonably rely upon this kind of 
information in forming their opinions. The trial court also properly exercised its 
discretion when it sustained objections to cross-examination of the medical examiner 
asking whether hypothetical conduct would demonstrate intent to kill, extreme emotional 
distress, and criminal negligence. 
2. Defendant's claim that the trial court answered a question by the jury when 
defendant was not present is inadequately briefed and, in any event, unsupported by the 
record. 
3. Defendant invited any error in the jury instructions and therefore is not entitled 
to plain error review. Defendant has inadequately briefed his plain error claim. In any 
case, defendant has not demonstrated plain error. He has not shown that the order of 
deliberation instruction, given as a recommendation and not as a requirement, deprived 
him of his right to have the jury consider the lesser included offenses. Further, he has not 
shown that the jury instructions as a whole misled the jury, that the alleged error should 
have been obvious, or that the alleged error was harmful. 
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4. The prosecutor's questions about the gun's flash pattern were questions about 
the operation of the gun and within the prosecution/defense agreement. The prosecutor's 
questions about the propensity of the gun to go off if dropped, thrown, or tugged were 
also within the agreement. The gun expert's volunteered testimony that the flash would 
have burned the hands of someone pulling on the barrel when the gun was fired, if 
improper, was not prejudicial. The court struck the testimony and gave a curative 
instruction. In any event, the testimony was not of itself inadmissible, and defendant's 
failure to seek a continuance to meet any surprise waived his claim. 
5. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial where 
defendant claimed he had newly discovered evidence, but where the proffered evidence 
could have been discovered and produced at trial and where the proffered evidence was, 
in any case, inadmissible. 
6. The evidence sufficed to sustain the verdict. Evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot the victim with the 
intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
(Response to defendant's arguments A, B, and C) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S CONFRONTATION RIGHTS IN ITS RULINGS ON THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY 
"The trial court has wide discretion" in its rulings on the admissibility of expert 
testimony, "and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." 
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State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). A reviewing court 
will not reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony unless the trial court's 
decision "exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, \ 66, 44 P.3d 
794 (citations omitted). Further, a trial court may exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues. Utah R. Evid. 
403. 
A. The medical examiner did not testify to mental state or condition when he 
testified that he had classified the death as a homicide. 
Defendant claims that the medical examiner testified to an issue reserved for the 
jury when he "was allowed to testify that the manner of death was 'homicide' and that it 
occurred by a 'deliberate act.'" Br. Aplt. at 30. Defendant claims that this testimony 
constituted testimony of defendant's intent for purposes of the murder statute. Id. In 
making this argument, defendant misconstrues the testimony and ignores its context. The 
medical examiner offered no testimony regarding the intent element. 
Under rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, an expert witness may not testify "as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." Utah R. Evid. 704(b). This is an 
issue for the jury. Id. 
"Criminal homicide constitutes murder if.. . the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another [or] intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the 
actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a) & (b). To return a verdict of guilty, the jury must 
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therefore find not merely that the actor intended to fire a weapon, but that the actor acted 
with the intent to kill or injure. An expert therefore may not testify regarding a shooter's 
intent to kill or injure. 
Dr. Leis did not offer an opinion regarding the intent element of murder. He 
testified that as part of his responsibilities as a medical examiner he must offer an opinion 
about the cause of death and about the manner of death. R. 490:184. His opinion about 
the manner of death requires that he assign the death to one of five categories of cause— 
natural cause, accident, suicide, homicide, or undetermined cause. Id. He also explained 
that if a death appears to be the result of an intentional shooting it is classified as a 
homicide, even though it may be accidental in the sense that the shooter did not intend to 
kill or hurt anyone. For instance, if "somebody [i]s unaware of a gun being loaded and it 
[i]s loaded and they pull[] the trigger" and kill a person, the death is classified as a 
homicide. Id. at 189. The death would be classified as an accident only if the gun is 
"faulty in some capacity." Id. Classifying the death as a homicide thus involves no 
judgment about "the state of mind of the person who may have been involved in firing [a] 
shot," only his act, and so would not be inconsistent with a jury verdict that the shooter 
did not intend to cause the death or injury. Id. at 190-91 
Within this framework, Dr. Leis testified that the cause of death was a gunshot 
wound to the head. Id. at 184. He also testified that he had certified the manner of death 
as a homicide. Id. This testimony is permissible. See State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 568 
(Utah App. 1992) (suggesting the admissibility of expert testimony that suicide by a 
gunshot to the eye would be unusual); see also State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 
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1994) (upholding the admissibility of an examining pediatrician's testimony that a 
victim's genital trauma was consistent with abuse); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 542-44 
(Utah 1983) (permitting testimony that injuries were consistent with battered child 
syndrome and stating that "[a]n expert medical witness may give his opinion as to the 
means used to inflict a particular injury, based on his deduction from the appearance of 
the injury itself) (internal quotation and citation omitted), rev 'd on other grounds, State 
v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997); State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 523-24 (Utah 
App. 1998) (permitting testimony that a victim's physical symptoms were consistent with 
nonconsensual, forcible sex). Cf. State v. Jaegar, 1999 UT 1, ffl[ 36-37, 973 P.2d 404 
(noting medical expert's testimony that autopsy and gunshot residue test showed that 
victim's death was a homicide, not a suicide). 
Thus, defendant gave an opinion that the bullet wound appeared consistent with a 
shooting by someone other than the victim and by someone who had deliberately pulled 
the trigger. He did not give an opinion that the person who pulled the trigger intended to 
kill or seriously injure the victim. See Sippio v. State, 714 A.2d 864, 875 (Md. 1998) 
(testimony that homicide was manner of death was not testimony to shooter's intent). 
B. The facts relied upon by the medical expert in forming his opinions were of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 
Under the rules of evidence, an expert may offer an opinion based on information 
he perceives or based on facts and data made known to him, if that information is "of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions." Utah 
R. Evid. 703; State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^ 18, 1 P.3d 546. The facts and data need not 
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be in evidence or even be admissible if an expert in the field would be justified in relying 
upon them in rendering his opinion. See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1224 (Utah 
1986); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant here objects to the medical examiner's testimony at trial because the 
medical examiner referred to his review of investigative reports when giving preliminary 
hearing testimony. Br. Aplt. at 34-38. The medical examiner based his trial testimony on 
his autopsy, on his own observations of the body at the crime scene, and on "the 
investigative information I had available to me." R. 490:185. His testimony based on his 
autopsy and on his own observations of the body is unchallenged. To the extent his 
testimony was based on investigative information from facts and data made known to 
him by investigating officers, his testimony was permissible under the rules because the 
facts and data were of a type reasonably relied upon by medical examiners. Dr. Leis 
himself testified at the preliminary hearing that medical examiners commonly rely on 
investigative sources in formulating their opinions. See R. 487:31-32. Further, case law 
supports the propriety of a medical examiner's reliance on information received from 
investigating officers. See, e.g., Sippio, 714 A.2d at 874 (permitting medical examiner's 
opinion based on facts determined by the examiner, "as well as relevant information 
obtained from a reliable police source"); State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 294 (Minn. 
2002) (permitting medical examiner's testimony based on autopsy finding and on 
information provided by police). Cf. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ffl[ 13, 41, 27 P.3d 1115 
(holding proper medical examiner's testimony that, upon applying the physical evidence 
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to a fact pattern presented by police investigators, he had changed his classification of a 
victim's death from suicide to homicide). 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant's 
confrontation rights when it sustained several objections to 
cross-examination, where the probative value of the evidence defendant 
sought to elicit was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would 
confuse the issues and mislead the jury. 
A defendant has the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. 
State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, f 18, 41 P.3d 1137. A criminal defendant may "state[] 
a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging 
in [certain] otherwise appropriate cross-examination . . . ." Id. (citing Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. (i73, 680 (1986)). But "otherwise appropriate cross-examination" does 
not include the elicitation of inadmissible or properly excluded testimony. "[An] accused 
does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is . . . inadmissible under 
standard rules of evidence." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). The United 
States Supreme Court has clearly articulated this limitation on cross-examination: "[W]e 
have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of 
evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if 
the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
683, 690 (1986). Under the evidentiary rules, a trial court may exclude evidence where 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the 
issues or mislead the jury. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Here, the trial court permitted defendant to cross-examine the medical examiner. 
The trial court did not place any limitation on cross-examination. The trial court did, 
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however, sustain the prosecution's objections to defense counsel's questions about the 
intent of a hypothetical shooter. R. 490:189 ("[Y]ou would agree that [a theoretical 
person] wasn't intending . . . ."). The court also sustained objections to questions 
requiring legal conclusions. R. 490:190 ("[A] gunshot wound that you classified for your 
purposes as a homicide could be fired under extreme emotional distress?"); 490:191 
("And because you're not using intent in making your determinations, it wouldn't 
specifically include somebody acting with criminal negligence. Correct?"). 
These questions asked for testimony that may have appeared to the jury to be 
testimony regarding defendant's intent or mental state. An expert witness may not testify 
as to whether a defendant did or did not have the mental state constituting an element of 
the offense. See Utah R. Evid. 704(b). He may not testify as to whether a defendant was 
acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
203 & 205 (stating that criminal homicide is manslaughter if the actor commits a 
homicide which would be murder, but acts "under the influence of extreme emotional 
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse"). He may not testify as to 
whether a defendant was acting with criminal negligence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
206 (stating that "[c]riminal homicide is negligent homicide if the actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of another"). While the cross-examination 
questions may not technically have asked the expert's opinion of defendant's state of 
mind, they could have confused the jury on that issue. The probative value of the 
testimony sought was therefore substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion, 
especially where other testimony on both direct and cross-examination clearly explained 
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that the medical examiner's classification of the death as a homicide was not a judgment 
regarding the shooter's intent. See Pont LA., above, see also R. 490:190, 191 (medical 
examiner's statements that he did not make any judgment about state or mind or intent in 
reaching a conclusion about the manner of death). 
Moreover, whether someone might be acting "under the influence of extreme 
emotional distress" or whether he might be acting "with criminal negligence" is not 
within the medical examiner's expertise. See Utah R. Evid. 702. An opinion about these 
matters calls for a legal conclusion, not a medical judgment. Thus, the medical 
examiner's opinions about these matters is not admissible. See Utah R. Evid. 701, 702. 
The trial court acted within its discretion when it sustained the prosecutor's 
objections to defense counsel's questioning regarding these matters. Further, even had 
the trial court erred, the error was harmless. Defendant sufficiently clarified the meaning 
of the medical examiner's testimony that the cause of death was homicide and that it 
occurred by a deliberate act. See Point LA., above. Defendant clarified on 
cross-examination that the medical examiner did not "use intent in making [his] 
determinations about the manner of death." R. 490:190. Neither did the medical 
examiner make any determination about the "state of mind of the person who may have 
been involved in firing [the] shot." Id. at 191. Thus, the excluded testimony would have 
been merely cumulative of testimony elicited by other questions. No reasonable 
probability exists of a more favorable outcome, had the excluded testimony been 
admitted. See State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1998) ("Harmless errors are errors 
which, although preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently 
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inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings."). 
II. 
(Response to defendant's argument D) 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE COURT ANSWERED A QUESTION BY 
THE JURY OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE IS INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED AND WITHOUT RECORD SUPPORT 
Defendant claims that his right to due process was denied because the trial court 
discussed with the jury, in defendant's absence, a question submitted by the jury during 
their deliberations. Br. Aplt. at 41-42. Defendant does not cite to the record nor does he 
detail any of the circumstances surrounding the incident, if it occurred, or the nature of 
the question. Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue and this Court should 
decline to address it. As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "[A] reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply 
a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 
784(111. App. 1981)). 
Defendant's claim is, in fact, without record support. "When a defendant 
predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting 
such an allegation by an adequate record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982). "Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the reviewing] court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] 
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simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record." Id. at 293. 
Defendant concedes that no record evidence supports this claim. Br. Aplt. at 25. 
This Court must therefore assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, U 11, 12 P-3d 92; State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah 
App. 1998).1 
III. 
(Response to defendant's argument E) 
ANY ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WAS INVITED; FURTHER, 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ORDER OF 
DELIBERATION INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred when instructing the jury on the 
order of deliberation.2 Br. Aplt. at 42. Defense counsel invited any error below and 
therefore is not entitled to appellate review for plain error. Further, while defendant 
claims plain error, he argues neither that the error was obvious nor that it was harmful. 
His claim is thus inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to address it. In any 
case, defendant has not demonstrated plain error: he has not shown that error occurred, 
that it was obvious, and that it was harmful. 
1
 In any event, according to defendant's argument in his motion below, defense 
counsel was present during the alleged incident and apparently did not object. See 
R. 414. Counsel's failure to object waives defendant's right to presence. State v. Lee, 
585 P.2d 58 (Utah 1978). 
While defendant references instruction 19, his argument addresses instruction 20, 
the order of deliberation instruction. R. 267-68. 
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A. Defendant invited any error in the jury instructions. 
Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[u]nless a party 
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be 
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
However, an instruction may be reviewed under the manifest injustice exception only 
where counsel "failed to object to the instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ f 54, 
70 P.3d 111 (emphasis in original). Review is permitted where counsel "instead of 
objecting,. . . merely remained silent at trial." Id. (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). "However, if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to 
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will 
not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception." Id. (citations omitted). 
The rule serves two purposes: first, to afford the trial court the first opportunity to 
address the claim of error, and, second, to discourage "parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Where the trial court asks for objections and a 
party affirmatively indicates that it has no objections, the party approves the language of 
the instructions. Id. at f 55; cf State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, t 39 n.10, P.3d 
(stating that "it would appear that Hamilton may preclude application of the plain error 
analysis under Rule 19(e)," but not addressing the issue because it was not raised in the 
district court or briefed on appeal). 
Here, before instructing the jury on the final day of trial, the court asked counsel 
for both parties whether they "ha[d] gone over the [final] instructions." R. 491:275. 
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Counsel stated that they had. Id. The court then asked, "Do we need to say more?" Id. 
Defense counsel answered first. Id. He said that instructions 11 and 12 were duplicative. 
Id. He also stated, "Then the other concern I have relates to [instructions 17 and 30]," 
which referred to "omissions." Id. at 275-79. The court deleted the duplicative 
instruction and the references to "omissions." Id. at 275, 278. Defense counsel 
concluded, "That will be fine. Those are my concerns, your Honor." Id. at 279. The 
prosecutor then responded to the court's inquiry, saying, "The State has no concerns with 
the instructions." Id. 
Thus, the evidence shows that before the trial court instructed the jury, defense 
counsel approved the language of the instruction now challenged on appeal. Defense 
counsel, "by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he . . . had no 
objection to [the order of deliberation] jury instruction," or to any instruction other than 
those he had specifically addressed. Defendant thus invited any error and may not argue 
plain error on appeal. 
B. Defendant claims, but does not argue or attempt to demonstrate, plain error; 
thus, defendant has inadequately briefed his claim and this court should 
decline to address it. 
Even assuming that error was not invited, defendant's plain error claim is 
inadequately briefed. This Court should therefore decline to address it. 
"Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given 
to the jury." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 
346 (discussing preservation requirement and plain error exception); State v. Kazda, 545 
23 
P.2d 190, 193 (Utah 1976) ("when a party fails to make a proper objection to an 
erroneous instruction . . . he is thereafter precluded from contending error"). 
Unless a party objects, a jury "instruction may not be assigned as error except to 
avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). In this context, "manifest injustice" 
means "plain error." See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1994) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that 
error occurred, that the error should have been obvious, and that the error was harmful. 
See Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031. "[I]f any one of those requirements is not met, plain error 
is not established." Id. 
Here, defendant does not cite to the plain error standard in his standard of review, 
in his summary of the argument, or in the argument itself. See Br. Aplt. at 4, 25-26, 42-
43. Defendant uses the phrase "plain error" because he did not object below, but he does 
not make a plain error argument. He does not explain why the claimed error should have 
been obvious or why it was harmful. In fact, he argues not that the error was harmful, but 
that the jury instruction "requires reversal for a new trial unless the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. at 44. Defendant thus ignores Utah precedent 
holding that "the preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional 
questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 10 P.3d 346 (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant has not adequately briefed his "plain error" argument. "When a party 
fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State 
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v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, <[ 12, 52 P.3d 467. "An issue is inadequately briefed when 
the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138 
(citations omitted). Having failed to make a plain error argument, defendant has 
improperly shifted the burden of argument to this Court. This Court should decline to 
address defendant's plain error claim. 
C. In any case, defendant has not demonstrated plain error: he has not shown 
that error occurred, that it was obvious, and that it was harmful. 
Defendant claims that the order of deliberation jury instruction prohibited the jury 
from considering the lesser included offense of negligent homicide and "violated his right 
to present a defense." Br. Aplt. at 44. Defendant did not object below and therefore 
argues plain error on appeal.3 Id. at 42. 
Defendant has not made and could not prevail on an argument that the trial 
court's denial of his motion for a new trial resuscitated his claim. The trial court denied 
the motion for a new trial, "adopting] plaintiffs arguments in support of the denial." 
R. 466. In opposing the motion, the State had argued that "defendant's failure to object 
to a specific jury instruction precludes the defendant from later attacking the verdict 
based upon that instruction." R. 452-53. As an alternative, the State had argued that 
defendant had not met any of the plain error requirements. R. 454-455. Thus, in denying 
the motion for the reasons given by the State, the trial court found the claim untimely as 
well as without merit. A ruling that a claim is untimely does not resuscitate the claim. 
Cf. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that when trial court 
considered the merits of a motion for relief from judgment it de facto considered the 
motion as timely). 
Further, under the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Casey, a trial court's 
post-verdict ruling on the merits of an instructional error claim does not resuscitate it. In 
Casey, the supreme court treated a claim of error as unpreserved and required the 
defendant to show plain error even though the trial court had addressed the accuracy of 
the instruction in a motion for a new trial. 2003 UT 33 at fflf 39, 45. This decision 
comports with the purpose underlying rule 19(e), that is, to require objections to jury 
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To prevail on this claim, defendant must show that error occurred, that the error 
should have been obvious, and that the error was harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. To 
show error, defendant must not only demonstrate some inaccuracy in one or more 
instructions, but must also demonstrate that "the instructions taken as a whole" misled the 
jury. See, e.g., Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, \ 37, 993 P.2d 191 ("As we have 
repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the 
applicable law, reversible error does not arise merely because one jury instruction, 
standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been.") (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) ("[W]e review jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case."); State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 
TJ 31, 64 P.3d 1218 ("Jury instructions will be affirmed when the instructions, taken as a 
whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have been.") (internal quotation 
and citation omitted). 
1. Background. 
Prior to closing argument, the trial court gave jury instructions, including 
instruction 20, which is reproduced here in its entirety: 
The following is a suggested but not required order of deliberation 
to guide you in considering your verdict options. 
instructions at a time when the trial court can both correct any error and give any 
corrected instruction to the jury. 
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First, you should determine whether or not the evidence has 
established the crime of Murder. If you unanimously find that all the 
elements of Murder[] have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
should not immediately convict the defendant of Murder. Instead, you 
should consider whether the defendant also caused the death under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. If the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant caused the death under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse, then you must find that the defendant is guilty of Manslaughter and 
not of Murder. 
On the other hand, if you unanimously agree that the evidence has 
failed to establish any of the elements of Murder, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you should consider whether the defendant is guilty of Negligent 
Homicide. If you unanimously agree that the evidence establishes] all of 
the elements of Negligent Homicide, you must find the defendant guilty of 
Negligent Homicide. However, if you unanimously agree that the evidence 
has failed to establish any of the elements of Negligent Homicide, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
R. 267-68; 491:280 (emphasis added). 
The court gave the jury several other instructions relevant to defendant's claim. 
• Instruction 2 charged the jury to consider and construe all of the 
instructions "as one connected whole." R. 247. 
• Instruction 9 provided that "[i]n considering the matter of the affirmative 
defense of acting under extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation . . . you are instructed that a defendant does not 
have to establish such defense by any burden of proof." R. 254. "Rather, if 
there is some evidence which tends to show that the defendant acted under 
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation, the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 
under such extreme emotional distress." Id. 
• Instructions 10 directed the jury "to consider as an alternative whether or 
not the defendant is guilty of the crime of Negligent Homicide." R. 255. 
Instruction 11 defined criminal negligence, and instruction 12 advised the 
jury that "criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another." R. 256-57. 
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• Instruction 21 stated that "[i]f you find that the defendant in this case has 
committed a public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to which of 
two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, you must convict the defendant 
only of the lower degree." R. 269. 
• Instruction 33 provided "[t]hat the verdict must express the individual 
opinion of each juror," and instruction 38 cautioned that "you should not 
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of 
evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of 
the opinion of the other jurors." R. 281, 286. 
• Instruction 41, the verdict instruction, stated that "it requires a unanimous 
concurrence of all the jurors to find a verdict." R. 289. 
2. Instruction 20 did not mandate an order of deliberation. Further, in the 
context of the instructions as a whole, it could not reasonably have created 
any confusion. 
Defendant claims that instruction 20 "improperly required the jury to 
'unanimously agree that the evidence has failed to establish any of the elements of 
Murder' before they could consider the lesser-included offense of Negligent Homicide." 
Br. Aplt at 43-44. Defendant explains, "A proper instruction would have directed the 
jurors that they could consider the lesser-included offense if they did not unanimously 
agree that all the elements of murder were met." Id. at 44. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "it would be wel l . . . to avoid instructing 
[jury members] that they must find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense before 
they may consider lesser included offenses." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 284 (Utah 
1989). It is better to instruct "that they should consider lesser included offenses if they 
do not find the defendant guilty of the charged offense." Id. This difference is "subtle," 
but "it avoids any possible misunderstanding that the jury must, by a unanimous vote, 
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acquit the defendant on the charged offense before it may consider the lesser offense." 
Id. 
Nonetheless, the court has never reversed because an order of deliberation 
instruction could be misleading where the instruction suggested, but did not require the 
order of deliberation. Neither has the court reversed because an order of deliberation 
instruction was by itself misleading where the instruction, when read in connection with 
the other instructions, would not have deprived the defendant of the right to proper 
consideration of lesser included offenses. 
a. The instruction here suggested, but did not mandate an order of deliberation. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed potentially confusing order of deliberation 
instructions in State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994), State v. Piansiaksone, 954 
P.2d 861 (Utah 1998), and State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94. 
In Powell, the trial court gave the jury oral instructions stating that if they found 
the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree, they should determine whether 
he was guilty of manslaughter, and if they determined that he was not guilty of 
manslaughter, they should determine whether he was guilty of negligent homicide. 872 
P.2d at 1031. Although this instruction indicated the jury should begin by determining 
whether defendant was guilty of murder, move to manslaughter only if they found the 
defendant "not guilty" of murder, and move to negligent homicide only if they found 
defendant "not guilty" of manslaughter, the supreme court did not reverse. Id. at 1032. 
The court construed the instructions, read as a whole "as suggesting to the jury a logical 
approach to the three criminal homicide alternatives rather than as commanding an 
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absolute progression through the possible options." Id. Thus, the court stated, "We do 
not believe that a juror would have felt compelled to acquit as to the second degree 
murder charge before considering the lesser included offenses." Id. 
On the other hand, in Piansiaksone, where the supreme court reversed, the order of 
deliberation instruction was given as a requirement, not "by way of suggestion and 
recommendation." See 954 P.2d at 870. Likewise, in Shumway, where the supreme court 
also reversed, the trial court gave the order of deliberation instruction as a requirement, 
not a suggestion. See 2002 UT 124 at ffl| 4-5. The instruction mandated that the jury find 
"that the evidence failfed] to establish one or more of the elements of Murder" before the 
jurors could consider lesser included offenses. Id. 
Here, the first line of instruction 20 is clear: "The following mstruction is a 
suggested but not required order of deliberation to guide you in considering your verdict 
options." R. 267. Thus, while the instruction may not have been completely clear, it 
mandated nothing. The jury was free to disregard it. Like the instruction in Powell, and 
unlike the suggestions in Piansiaksone and Shumway, it suggested, but did not command, 
a progression through the options. Thus, the potential for confusion did not result in error 
that could have required reversal. 
b. Instruction 20, in the context of the instructions as a whole, could not 
reasonably have created any confusion. 
Further, a reviewing court will not reverse a challenged order of deliberation 
instruction where the instruction, "when read in connection with the other written 
instructions given the jury, could not have reasonably created any confusion." Gardner, 
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789 P.2d at 284. When a defendant challenges an order of deliberation instruction, the 
reviewing court must review the instructions as a whole to determine whether they have 
misled the jury and thereby deprived the defendant of the right to proper consideration of 
lesser included offenses. Id. Lack of clarity in an order of deliberation instruction does 
not, of itself, constitute error when the instructions as a whole "allow[] the jury to give 
proper consideration to the lesser included offenses." Id. 
In Gardner, the trial court gave the jury an instruction similar to the instruction 
challenged in this case: "If you find [the defendant] not guilty of murder in the first 
degree, you shall then consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the lesser 
included offense of. . . murder in the second degree." Id. at 283-84. Nonetheless, the 
court found that the instructions as whole permitted proper consideration of the lesser 
offenses. Id. In so doing, the court pointed to instructions (1) requiring a unanimous 
vote to convict and (2) directing that, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to which of 
two degrees of the crime the defendant was guilty, the jury should convict of the lower 
degree only. 
In the instant case, the instructions as a whole permit proper consideration of the 
lesser offense. Like the instructions in Gardner, the instructions here (1) require a 
unanimous vote to convict and (2) direct the jury to convict on the offense of lower 
degree if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to which of two degrees of the crime the 
defendant is guilty. R. 269, 289. 
In sum, defendant has not demonstrated that jury instruction 20, which was given 
by way of recommendation only, and which was clarified by its context in the 
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instructions as a whole, prohibited the jury from considering the lesser included offense 
of negligent homicide or violated defendant's right to present a defense. 
3. Defendant has not shown that error, if any, was both obvious and harmful. 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that error occurred, that it was 
obvious, and that it was harmful. See Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031. Even assuming error 
occurred in this case, defendant has not shown that it was obvious. As explained above, 
the difference between instructing the jury to consider a lesser included offense if they 
"find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense," rather than "if they do not find the 
defendant guilty of the charged offense," is "subtle." Gardner, 789 P.2d at 284. That 
which is subtle is not obvious. 
Further, the supreme court's precedent has found error in order of deliberation 
instructions only where the instructions have been given by way of absolute direction and 
not by means of suggestion. See Shumway, 2002 UT App 124 at ^ | 4-5; Piansiaksone, 
954 P.2d at 870. Error therefore should not have been obvious where the trial court took 
care to give its order or deliberation instruction by way of suggestion only. 
Further, defendant has not shown that the challenged instruction was harmful. 
While, in general, a reviewing court must presume that the jury followed the instructions 
given by the trial court, that presumption is associated with mandatory instructions. See 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). With an instruction given merely by 
way of suggestion, a jury is free to follow or not follow it. Thus, a defendant cannot rely 
on the presumption to show prejudice. Defendant has not otherwise shown that any error 
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claim. 
IV 
(Response to defendant's arguments i „./« u ) 
THE TRIAL l u t K i ULU i S u i ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN n u £ N I E D 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON HIS CLAIM OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT; NO MISCONDUCT OCCURRED AND, IN 
ANY CASE, DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN HARM 
Defendai it i aises :laii i is of pi oseci ltoi ial miscoi ldi ict ii i :onnect ion ;ritl i tl le 
p rosecu tor ' s quest ioning of the gun expert. Br. Aplt . at 45-47 . Defendant first raised 
these claims in connection, with his mot ion for a n e w trial P -414. 4 2 t 2* The trial 
:c i n t denied tl i z i :t IC Xi : i i R 1 66 I I: n is, ot i appeal. this ( •* • IT "i tl le 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion. See State v. Pritchett, 
2003 I T 2 4 , * 10, 69 P.3d 1278. 
. -_UT i it' 's claii i: I is pi edicated oi i a pi eti ial agi een lei it i egai clii lg tl le scope of 
testimony iv P given by the gun expert, Nicholas J. Roberts, apparently a substitute for 
David Wakefield, who was unavailable to testify. R. 216; 489:24-25; 490:193. 
Observing m.:: - :*erts was a last minute expert, defense counsel stated that he 1 lad 
agreed in advance not to object based on notice, so long as Robert's testimony was 
limited to the description of the physical operation of the gin ^. 489:25. The prosecutor 
that was inherently inadmissible, but that he adduced testimony in violation of the 
agreement regarding notice. 
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A. Defendant has not demonstrated that questions about the gun's flash pattern 
were beyond the scope of the agreement. 
Defendant claims that "the prosecutor elicited inadmissible expert testimony about 
the lack of bum marks on the hands of the deceased." Br. Aplt. at 44. Defendant claims 
that the prosecutor acted improperly when he questioned the gun expert about the gun's 
flash pattern and when, during a discussion of whether the gun could fire without a 
trigger pull, he asked the gun expert what would happen in two people were struggling or 
playing tug-of-war with the gun. See id. at 45-47. Defendant claims that the flash test 
"was specifically described as being beyond the scope of the agreed testimony" and that 
"[t]he court agreed that the testimony was inadmissible and sustained the defense's 
objection to the testimony." Id. at 45. 
Defendant's claim that the prosecutor's questions about the flash test were beyond 
the scope of the agreement, however, is without record support. Defendant cites to the 
trial transcript at 168-69, where defense counsel states only that it was his own 
understanding that the flash test was beyond the scope of the agreement. R. 490:168-69. 
The prosecutor, however, countered that the flash test was "part of the physics of how 
[the gun] works and it falls under mechanics," i.e., the physical operation of the gun. Id. 
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, striking only the gun expert's "volunteered 
testimony . . . that somebody would have been burned" and stating that the jury did not 
"have to disregard [any other part of] the answer to the hypothetical question because 
most of the answer was fine." R. 490:169-70. 
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• I ' rosea itc i ial i: i liscoi ldi ict oe ::i n s ' - 1 lei e a pi oseci ltoi asl ::s ""qi iestions 01 [i :t iak.es] 
remarks [that] call[] to the j u r y ' s at tention mat ters they would not be justified in 
cons ider ing ." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 rT-tab \ p p 1 ^ 4 * 4 The trial . -urt 
reasonably concluded that til: ic prosecutoi ' s qi lestic »i is about vl lat the gi n I'S flasl i pattern 
a n c j w j i e t j i e r t | i e g U n j^ig^t discharge during a tug-of-war were within questions about the 
operation of the gun and proper under the notice agreement. R 490:169-70. The 
prosecutor's questions did not call the jury s attention to any matter the jury would not 
discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct. See R. 466. !! :;ie gun expert gave improper testimony, that testimony was 
B. No harm occurred where the trial court gave a curative instruction directing 
the jury to disregard the gun expert's volunteered testimony. 
Fi n thei , tl le gi n i expei t's v oh n lteei eel testin i :>f i) ' 11 ial: s- :)i i iebod> woi ild 1 lav e be si i 
burned , , was harmless. The trial court struck the statement and gave a curative 
instruction. "To demonstrate reversible error stemming from the presentation of evidence 
demonstrate that there [was] an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury [was] unable to 
follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect [was] 'devastating' 
Prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error oilly \\ !K t HKICI mc 
circumstances, the jury was probably influenced by the [prosecutor's; icmarks" and 
"there is a reasonable likelihood, that in its absence, there would have K-ep a r . ••!. 
favorable result." Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1290. 
to [him]." State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 50, 27 P.3d 1115, quoting State v. Harmon, 956 
P.2d 262, 272-73 (Utah 1998), in turn quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 
(1987). Defendant has not shown that probability.^ 
C. Defendant's failure to ask for a continuance waives his claim which is, when 
reduced to its essence, a claim that defendant lacked notice. 
Defendant does not claim that the gun expert's testimony was inherently 
inadmissible. Rather, he claims that the testimony was introduced in violation of an 
agreement he made not to object to the gun expert's testimony for lack of notice so long 
as the gun expert testified only to the operation of the gun. If defendant felt that the 
prosecutor's questioning exceeded the scope of the agreement and/or that he had been 
"surprised" by the expert's testimony, he could have requested a continuance to allow 
him time to meet the evidence. Defendant did not, probably because he did not believe 
that even with a continuance he could obtain evidence to undermine the testimony. 
^ Defendant claims that the stricken testimony was prejudicial. Br. Aplt. at 47. 
Defendant bases this claim on the affidavit of Tawni Hanseen, attached to defendant's 
motion for a new trial. See R. 434-35. Hanseen claims that a juror, Kurt Patterson, told 
her that the jury found it was significant that there were no burn wounds on the victim's 
body. Id. The affidavit is inadmissible testimony. First, it is hearsay. Second, even had 
Patterson himself given affidavit testimony, it would have been inadmissible. An 
affidavit by a juror representing the juror's perception of deliberations may not be 
considered by a reviewing court unless it refers to an improper outside influence. See 
Utah R. Evid. 606(b); see also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) 
(holding that evidence as to what was said and done in the jury room, other than evidence 
demonstrating that the verdict was determined by chance or resulted from bribery, is 
inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,4 (Utah App. 1993) 
(stating that "inquiries into the thought processes of the jurors are improper"). Moreover, 
the jury could properly have inferred the likelihood of burns from the admissible and 
admitted testimony about the gun's flash pattern and the expulsion of hot gases from the 




 \ 1 lere a defei idant's alleged 1 lai i i i is lack of i lotice, tl ns Coi n t i ' ill i lot i en •ri.e * • I l i s c l a i i i i 
unless he has sought a continuance. See State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, \ u , JU 
P.3d 969. The "failure of a defendant to seek a continuance negates any claim of surprise 
and amounts to a wan ei " / t / at ^ [ 13; see also Stale \ (jnnuis. ">J
 4 _v; * -^ - ;,.n 
1988) (stating that faili ire to see coi itn u lai ice to n leet e v idence. i lot pi operl> disclosed 
during discovery, waives relief). For that reason, the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion when it denied defendani s motion tor a new trial and this Court si lould dei ly 
defendai it any f i n thei i ev ie \ v 
• . , • • . . . / , . • • • 
(Response U- defendant's argument H) 
T H E T R I A L C o u R T PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED EVIDENCE WAS 
NEITHER "NEWLY DISCOVERED" NOR ADMISSIBLE 
Defendant claims that the affidavit of Barbara Penman constitutes newly 
discov ered evidei ice tc si lppoi I: a i ie * • ill::! nail Bi i\ pit at 53 54 1 1 ie af fida 'it, fii st 
presented to the trial court in support of defendant's motion for a new trial, states that 
Jeremy told Penman that he had seen defendant choking Coreen, that Penman therefore 
ask I * 
Coreen had no marks on her neck, and that Penman knew that defendant did not 
purposely kill Coreen. See R. 436. 
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new 
V Vc R 467 Defendant cannot prevail on this claim. 
A trial court may grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there was any 
impropriety in the initial trial that had a substantially adverse effect on the rights of a 
party. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). For a defendant to prevail on a motion for a new trial 
based on newly-discovered evidence, his evidence must meet three criteria: 
(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered and produced at trial; 
(2) It must not be merely cumulative; and 
(3) It must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the 
case. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ^ 16, 
994 P.2d 1237. Notably, "'[n]ew evidence is not evidence which was available to 
defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time of trial. Nor is it evidence that he 
knew about or could have discovered prior to trial." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985) (citations omitted). 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial, this Court 
"presume[s] that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination 
must be "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992). 
Here, defendant claims that Barbara Penman's affidavit testimony is newly 
discovered testimony. It appears, however, that defendant knew that Penman was present 
on the day of the shooting. See R. 490:231 (defendant's statement that Coreen's friends 
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v -ei e presei it); 489:* 1 8 ( le i ei i ly Kettlei 's t sstii i I 3! p ' 1:1 lat Barbie1 ' was pi esent). Fi irther, 
even if defendant had not known that Penman was present, Officer Gary Trost testified at 
the preliminary hearing, held five months before trial, that when he arrived at the scene 
»lioii!\ after ilu* shouting, he luiiml iln ' n mini Nainaf.ii I'UIMI in. ami tk fcndaiii -> kudu i in 
the bedroom. R. 487 :11 . Defendant was on notice well before trial that Penman was a 
potential witness. 
In any event, the affidav it testimony upon - HH . defendant relies is inadmi w . 
Defendant seeks to it iti odi ice Penn lan's testimon*-. mm moreen told her that defendant aid 
nor n ioke he* i*i: the da\ o: inc shooting. Br i\plt at 54. The proffered testimony is 
hearsay Defendant does not address any exception to the hearsay rule:, under \\ iiu : he 
testimony might be admitted , ai id tl le State has foi n id i lone 1 1 le • • • *; ^ n- ~x^r 
appears to be rule 804 ' s final exception for the statements of dead and otherwise 
unavailable declarants "not specificalh ^i>\^\^d l^ anv exception[] but having 
eqi ii1 'alent en en ii i istai itial gi lai ante *s < • I Ital i R E1 ' i- :1 804(b)(5). I I le 
statement Penman attributes to Corecn, ;.uv%c\er, lacks any guarantee of trustworthiness. 
Further, a statement cannot be admitted under this section unless it is m a d e known to the 
tthiTse parU pimi I hiiil i n I hr li'iiil null pti ipri III1, nun lliiinlnil ilui the n nlnn i 
would not have been admissible . 
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a new ti ial on the 
discovered" and was , in any case, inadmissible. 
VI. 
(Response to defendant's argument I) 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. 
Defendant conceded in his testimony below that "the gun went off... [as he was] trying 
to pull it away from [Coreen]." R. 490:236. He argued, however, that the shooting was 
accidental. Id. dXTil. Thus, the issue here is whether the evidence sufficed to sustain the 
jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot Coreen, intending to kill her 
or cause her serious bodily harm. 
In order to prevail on an insufficiency claim, a defendant must "first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding" and "then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^  25, 69 P.3d 1278. He must "demonstrate how the evidence 
against him was so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the 
verdict." Id. at |^ 26 (citations omitted). 
Defendant has not adequately marshaled the evidence. Rather, he has given a 
highly abbreviated account of the testimony given by each of the State's witnesses and 
then evaluated it in the light least favorable to the verdict. For instance, in recounting 
Detective Kelly Kent's testimony, defendant states: 
Detective Kelly Kent then provided objected-to hearsay testimony for the 
prosecution about an argument she said Jeremy Kettler told her about 
between the appellant and the victim—an argument Kettler himself did not 
describe during his testimony. Newly discovered evidence, in fact[,] flatly 
contradicts the Kent testimony. . . . 
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should decline to address his sufficiency argument. 
In any case, the evidence did suffice to support the verdict and, in particular, the 
ma} v nroven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
t.mi :nent is rarely established by direct evidence." State \ I~ J&ite. y»Of: I T * - * 
,. 4 (internal quotation and citatioii omitted), :.t- reviewing court''therefore 
mubi 10 i- f. • •- :—;i lmstantial evidence and all reason; ti >h : in it M < : n c e s • :li a;\ v i 1 tl lerefroi i i to 
determine whether the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
; iiant and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable .. anjus; 
( •>*• - \\ lotatioi 1 ai id citatioi i oi i lit ted) ' ' 
Here, the circumstantial evidence sufficed to support the jury's finding on tlle 
intent element. While defendant argued that the shooting was an accident, testimony was 
j. " " *f \ III: im • e ii lfei i: eci that iefei idai it < • as angi ) " ' -ith Coi o *i 11 i id 
had a motive h - ii :it:. Defendant had argued with the Coreen on the da> u! Uie 
shooting, had placed his hands on her neck, and had inflicted injuries consistent with 
i i t l cn ip t i ill s l i a i i i ' i i b l i n i i R I S 1 ' \s I  ((IN> I -Il \ I I m i l l i ill Ii m l , m l h.inl hi < m U P n h f ill mil 
a fight with Coreen's friends. R. 490:233-34 Defendant himself said that after entering 
tl le bedroom he had asked Coreen "what the heck the deal was with her friends." Id. at • 
the hell is [Magic's] problem?" Id. 
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Further, testimony was given that supported an inference that the shooting was 
intentional rather than accidental and that defendant intentionally prepared for the 
shooting. The gun expert testified that finng the gun would have required that the safety 
be removed, the gun cocked, and the tngger pulled. R. 490:149. Jeremy Kettler testified 
that he did not believe the gun was cocked when he gave it to defendant, immediately 
before defendant took the victim into the bedroom. R. 489:52. Defendant himself 
testified that he cocked the weapon either immediately before he entered the bedroom or 
after he entered the bedroom. R. 490:235. Further, Jeremy testified that when he opened 
the door and saw the body defendant said, "She made me do it," a statement from which 
the jury could have inferred intent, despite defendant's contemporaneous disclaimer that 
he "didn't mean to." R. 489:60. 
The wound itself provided further evidence from which the jury could have 
inferred intent. The bullet had entered Coreen's head at the inner side of the left eye, an 
unusual location for a wound that ensues from a tug-of-war. R. 490:177. Debris left in 
the eye showed "a close contact entrance wound," meaning that "the gun was either up 
next to the skin surface or in close proximity of the skin" at the time it discharged. Id at 
195. The jury could have inferred that it was unlikely, had a tug-of-war occurred, that 
Coreen would have pulled the gun close to her eye and thus have inferred the 
unlikelihood that defendant testified truthfully about the accidental nature of the incident. 
The jury also had evidence before it that, rather than assisting the victim, 
defendant had fled shortly after the shooting and that he had remained a fugitive for 
almost five months. R 489:97; 490:239-40. "While a defendant's flight from a crime 
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circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition to other circumstantial evidence, may 
be adequate to support such an inference." State v. Holgate, 2000 IJT 74, ^ f 23, 10 P.3d 
/. 
This evidence, while circumstantial, suffices to support a finding that defendant 
shot the victim, intending to kill her oi to J.UI*C her serious bodily injury. 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this _^ ( day of (jctbbes , 2003. 
MARKL.SHURH.hl-F 
Attorney General 
JEXT^ NE B. INOUYE O 
\ Assistant Attorney General 
x
^ Attorneys for Appellee 
6
 See also 1 Wharton s Criminal Evidence § 214, at 450 (Charles t,. iorcia ed., 
13th ed. 1972) ("Flight by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant, but 
is merely a circumstance to be considered with other factors as tending to show a 
consciousness of guilt and therefore guilt itself"), cited in Holgate, 2000 IIT 74 at ^ | 23 
n.6. 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^{ day of Q ( i ? i rs , 2003,1 either mailed first-
class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to 
appellant's counsel of record, as follows: 
PAUL GOT AY 
357 South 200 East, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
J. * 
JEAKNE B. I N O U Y E ^ 0 




A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of 
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
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I UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-5-203 
(j) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal 
public official, or a candidate for public office, and the 
homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that 
official position, act, capacity, or candidacy; 
(k) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforce-
ment officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, 
prison official, firefighter, judge or other court official, 
juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is 
either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or 
is related to that official position, and the actor knew, or 
reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or 
has held that official position; 
(1) the homicide was committed by means of a destruc-
tive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar 
device which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any 
place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed 
or delivered; 
(m) the homicide was committed during the act of 
unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or 
other public conveyance by use of threats or force with 
intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release 
of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, 
or any other person aboard, or to direct the route or 
movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert 
control over the public conveyance; 
(n) the homicide was committed by means of the ad 
ministration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of 
any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage* 
or quantity; 
(o) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained 
as a shield, hostage, or for ransom; 
(p) the actor was under a sentence of life imprisonment 
or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of the 
homicide; or 
(q) the homicide was committed in an especially hei-
nous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, 
any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death. 
(2) Aggravated murder is a capital offense. 
(3) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated 
murder or attempted aggravated murder that the defen-
dant caused the death of another or attempted to cause 
the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circum 
stances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifi-
able or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (dXaXt), emotional distress does 
not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection OXaXi) or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection OXaXii) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then, 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as 
follows: 
(i) aggravated murder to murder, and 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted 
murdei 
?*4-20& Murder. 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense** means: 
^ vioiation of Sea - : • : 
tine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2Xa), when 
the victim is younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child under Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section "76 8 
309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another, 
(b) intending to cause serious "bodily injury to an.oth.er,, 
the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that causes the death of another, 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, at-
tempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of any predi-
cate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in 
Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the com-
mission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace 
officer while in the commission or attempted commission 
of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 
76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making 
a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor 
uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated 
murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 
76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special 
mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony 
14) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or 
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of 
another or attempted to cause the death of another 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circum-
stances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifi-
able or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
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(b) Under Subsection (4)(aXi) emotional distress does 
not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection (4XaXi) or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection (4XaXii) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as 
follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
2000 
76-5-204. Death of other than intended victim no de-
fense. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the 
actor caused the death of a person other than the intended 
victim shall not constitute a defense for any purpose to 
criminal homicide. 1973 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the ac-
tor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(3); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is estab-
lished under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree Mitt 
70-5-205.5. Special mitigation reducing the level of 
criminal homicide offense — Burden of proof 
— Application to reduce offense. 
(1) Special mitigation exists when: 
(a) the actor causes the death of another under circum-
stances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts 
under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; and 
(b) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts 
existed as the defendant believed them to be in his 
delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justifi-
cation for his conduct. 
(2) This section applies only if the defendant's actions, in 
light of his delusion, were reasonable from the objective 
viewpoint of a reasonable person. 
(3) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily 
consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled substances, 
or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense may 
not claim mitigation of the offense under this section on the 
basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, 
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness. 
(4) (a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as 
listed in Subsection (4Xb) are proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation 
under this section is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced 
charge as provided in Subsection (4Xt>). 
(b) If under Subsection (4Xa) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant 
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder, 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found 
guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
(5) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the 
jury is required to establish the existence of the special 
mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation b> a unani-
mous vote, it shall return a verdict on the reduced charge 
as provided in Subsection (4). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special 
mitigation has not been established, it shall convict the 
defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution 
has established all the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether 
or not special mitigation has been established, the result 
is a hung jury. 
(6) (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the 
trier of fact, it shall return a special verdict indicating 
whether the existence of special mitigation has been 
found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at 
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis 
for its general verdict. 
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any 
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree 
from that offense, the elements of which the evidence has 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. 1999 
76-5-206. Negl igent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanoi , 1973 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safely operat-
ing the vehicle, and causes the death of another by 
operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" 
means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons^ exer-
cise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safely operat-
ing the vehicle, and causes the death of another by 
operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent 
manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally neg-
ligent" means criminal negligence as defined by Subsec-
tion 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided 
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
section. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon 
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is on or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense to any charge of violating this section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol con-
tent or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
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(b) Under Subsection (4Xa)(i) emotional distress does 
not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the 
defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection (4Xa)(i) or the reasonable belief of the 
actor under Subsection (4Xa)(ii) shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as 
follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
2000 
76-5-204. Death of other than intended victim no de-
fense. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the 
actor caused the death of a person other than the intended 
victim shall not constitute a defense for any purpose to 
criminal homicide. 1973 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the ac-
tor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(3); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is estab-
lished under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 1W9 
76-5-205.5. Special mit igat ion reducing the level of 
criminal homicide offense — Burden of proof 
— Application to reduce offense. 
(1) Special mitigation exists when: 
(a) the actor causes the death of another under circum-
stances tha t are not legally justified, but the actor acts 
under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as 
defined in Section 76-2-305; and 
(b) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts 
existed as the defendant believed them to be in his 
delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justifi-
cation for his conduct. 
(2) This section applies only if the defendant's actions, in 
light of his delusion, were reasonable from the objective 
viewpoint of a reasonable person. 
(3) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily 
consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol controlled substances, 
or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense may 
not claim mitigation of the offense under this section on the 
basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, 
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness. 
(4) (a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as 
listed in Subsection (4Xb) are proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and also tha t the existence of special mitigation 
under this section is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced 
charge as provided in Subsection (4Xb). 
(b) If under Subsection (4Xa) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant 
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found 
guilty of manslaughter, or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
(5) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the 
jury is required to establish the existence of the special 
mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unani. 
mous vote, it shall return a verdict on the reduced charge 
as provided in Subsection (4). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special 
mitigation has not been established, it shall convict the 
defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution 
has established all the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether 
or not special mitigation has been established, the result 
is a hung jury. 
(6) (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the 
trier of fact, it shall return a special verdict indicating 
whether the existence of special mitigation has been 
found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at 
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis 
for its general verdict. 
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any 
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree 
from that offense, the elements of which the evidence has 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. 1999 
76-5-206. Negl igent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a clas3 A misdemeanor. 1973 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safely operat-
ing the vehicle, and causes the death of another by 
operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" 
means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons^ exer-
cise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a 
degree that renders the actor incapable of safely operat-
ing the vehicle, and causes the" death of another by 
operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent 
manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally neg-
ligent" means criminal negligence as defined by Subsec-
tion 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided 
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
section. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon 
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is on or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense to any charge of violating this section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol con-
tent or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
76-5-206. Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with criminal negligence, 
causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
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Rule 808. Competency of juror as witness. 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the 
juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the 
presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon that or any other jurors mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the yerokA 
or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes m connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for 
these purposes, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah 
case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972). 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact m issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was substanliallv the same. 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by 
or made known to the expert at or before W)e hearing. If of a type reasonably re\\e6 upon by experts m the particular 
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible m evidence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is \t-\e federal rule, verbatim, and expands Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), which limited facts or 
data not personally known to the expert to those made known to him at \he hearing, The provision that the facts or data 
upon which the expert relies for his opinion In a particular field may be of the type "reasonably relied upon by experts \n 
me particular field In forming opinions/' and need not otherwise be admissible also seems to expand Rule 56(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971). But see Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974). Recent Utah cases have tended 
towards recognition of the position taken by this rule. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979); Kallas v. 
Kaiias, 814 P*2d 641 (Utah 1980); State v.'Clavton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1982). 
Role 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided m subparagraph (b)T testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible Is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state 
an opinion or inference as to -whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is'the federal rule, verbatim, an6 comports with Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See Edwards v, 
Didericksen, 597 P/26 1328 (Utah 1979), 
This rule \s identical to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 1984. 
Hole 804 Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant; 
(1) ;s exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter ot the declarant's statement despite an order of the court 
to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(4) is unable to he preset or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or 
infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the 
declarant1 s attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant Is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is 
cue to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from Btxendmg or testifying, 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant Is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or In a 
deposition taken m compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or. \n a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in Merest, had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by a 
declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made \n good faith, 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was si the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary Interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant, to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid 
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true, A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement, 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, 
divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated: or (B) a 
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other 
by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to have accurate 
Information concerning the matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions, A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, If the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact: (8) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of It makes known to the adverse party sufficiently m advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), Rule 62(7)[(e)], Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). seems to be encompassed in Rule 804(a)(5). Subdivision (a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which 
permits judicial discretion to be applied in determining unavailability of a witness. 
Subdivision (b)(1) is'comparable to Rule 83(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule \s broader to the 
extent that It did not limit the admission of the testimony to a situation where the party to \j~\e action had the interest and 
opportunity to develop the testimony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P26 537 
(Utah 1981), 
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule was not limited to 
declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the impending death nor did if limit dying declarations In 
criminal prosecutions to homicide cases, The rule has been modified by making it applicable to any civil or criminal 
proceeding,, subject to the qualification that the judge finds the statement to have been made in good faith. 
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though it does not extend merely to 
social interests. 
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24); Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (b)(5) bad no counterpart, m Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties 
and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of 
terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court, and 
any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions 
shall be \n writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court 
directs, a party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. The court 
shall inform the parties of its action upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the 
parties 'with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to 60 so 
and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or ai such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written 
request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such requests 
shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request: and it 
shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final 
instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court shall provide a copy to any juror 
who requests one and may. in its disScretion, provide a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial 
or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the 
charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral 
instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court 
shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction 
or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In 
stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall 
instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the jury its final instructions. Unless 
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
